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Introduction
As has been the case in most developing and transition economies, banks in Bulgaria
have been the dominant financial institution. Development'of other financial
institutions, especially private sector institutions, has been very slow during most of the
1990s. Perhaps this was a good thing since laws establishing regulatory agencies did not
exist during the early 1990s, and the failure to properly regulate the banking system was
an important contributor to the Bulgarian financial crisis of 1996-1997. Since 1997 new
laws and changing circumstances have created an environment where a stock exchange
with extensive listing has been established, private insurance is more widespread, and
private pension systems have begun to emerge.
Dwing the financial crisis several banks faile4 depositors lost money and inflation
rose dramatically as the lev depreciated sharply. To restore confidence a currency board
was established. The establishment of the currency board also signalled that there was a
new regime with greater economic discipline.l The situation in the banking sector has
also improved dramatically. The banks have reduced their exposure to the non-financial
sector and the capitalisation of the banks rose to 36.7 per cent in 1998, against he
minimum requirement of 10 per cent (OECD, 1999).
Under the currency board regime, banks initially did little additional lending to the
non-enterprise sector. Instead they expanded their holdings of cash and government
bonds. More recently banks have taken somewhat'less conservative positions and have
expanded their lending to the non-financial sector and reduced their cash holdings, but
credit from the banking system remains very tight and the cost of borrowing high
(Caporale, et.al.,200l ).
The establishment of the currency board, and the stabilisation that came with it,
coincided with the end of the first wave of mass privatisation, While the mass
privatisation programme had many distinct features, this first wave was modelled after
the Czech programme. Citizens paid a small fee for vouchers which could be used to
bid for shares in state-owned enterprises in national auctions (Miller and Petranov,
2000).
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Once the mass privatisation auctions were conclude4 there was increased pressure
to develop new capital markets. New regulations were passed an4 unlike the Czechs
who did not establish a regulatory agency immediately, a Securities and Stock
Exchange Commission (SSEC) was created. At about the same time pressures began to
build to find better ways to manage the pension system. The value of state pensions had
seriously eroded during the early 1990s and the government urned its attention to
creating private institutions that could provide additional channels for retirement
savings-. ih" in.r.used stability and the lower inflation since the currency board also
made it easier for a private insurance market to develop. Another impetus for reform of
the insurance industry was extensive "mafia" penetration. By passing new laws and
making it more difficult to obtain a license, the government was able to reduce mafia
influence.
We then present an overview of recent developments in the capital markets. These
markets have had a roclcy start with low volume and poor liquidity. The insurance
industry subsequently analysed, has experienced the most growth among non-bank
financial sectors but is still relatively small. New pensions systems are beginning to
expand and show more rapid growth in the future. In the concluding section we discuss
other non-bank financial activities and future prospects for the sector in Bulgaria.
L. Capital Market and Capital Market Institutions
1.1. Laws and Institutions
1.1 .I . The Legal Basis for Capital Market Institutions
In June 1995 the Law on Securities, Exchange and Investment Company (LSSEIC) was
passed and actions were undertaken to create a regulatory structure and reorganise the
capital market. In January 1996, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SSEC) was
esiablished and the Central Depository opened in August. In 1995 several exchanges
merged and the Bulgarian stock exchange was founded. During the financial crisis
.onfid.n.. in the market eroded and trading ceased in late 1996. In July 1997,
following the last auctions in the first wave of mass privatisation, the Sofia stock
exchange and the Bulgarian stock exchange merged forming the Bulgaria stock
exchange-Sofia (BSE-Sofia) which opened in October 1997.The BSE-Sofia is now the
only licensed securities market. The LSSEIC was later amended and then superseded by
the public Offering of Securities Act (POSA) in early 2000. The changes in the new act
reflect experience gained during the early years of capital market development and
brings Bulgarian law into close alignment with the EU acquis. There were also some
changes *ttirtt improved company law. While it is too early to judge what the full
impact of these changes will be, there already appears to be improvement in general
corporate governance procedures.
Jeffrey B. Miller and Stefan Petranov, Non-Banking Financial Institutions in Bulgaia
1.1.2. Bulgarian Stock Exchange - Sofia
The BSE-Sofia is a joint-stock company. The state has a37.6 per cent interest, and the
remaining shares ate owned by financial institutions, i.e. banks, investment
intermediaries, financial brokerage houses and insurance companies. The POSA does
not allow any non-state shareholders to own more than 5 per cent of the shares. BSE-
Sofia is managed by a board of directors which is responsible for the operations of the
stock exchange. All decisions as to membership, trade in securities and sanctions
against stock dxchange members are co-ordinated through an ad hoc committee
established to meet conditions provided for in the POSA. The committee is a five-
member body including representatives of shareholders in the exchange, members of
the exchange, stockbrokers and issuers ofsecurities.
In an effort to guarantee transparency of transactions, equal treatment of traders and
strict observance of obligations, the BSE-Sofia has been established as a court of
arbitration and a guarantee fund. In principle, the BSE-Sofia stock operates three
separate markets, i.e. an official market, a free market and a bond market. In addition,
there is also a separate market where state-owned shares are sold as a part of the state's
privatisation programme.
The official stock market is subdivided into three segments. The specific listing
standards for each segment are given in Table 1.
Table I - BSE OFFICIAL MARKET LISTING STANDARDS
SegmentA Segment B Segment C
365
Completed financial years
with audited financial statements
Market capitalisation
Part of the issue owned by minority
shareholders (%)
Number of shareholders
Average monthly turnover -number of
shares
At least 2 At least I
AtleastBGL l0 At leastBGL500000
mil.
At least l0% At least 5%
At least 3
At least BGL 20
mil.
Atleast25o/o
At least 400
At least 1000
At least 100
At least 1000
At least 100
The issue should consist
of min. 50000 shares
Source: Proceedings Rules ofthe Sofia Stock Exchange.
Municipal and corporate bonds can also be listed on the bond market. The size of bond
issue must be at least BGL 1 million2 and the maturity must be at least 6 months. Issuers
of corporate bonds must have completed at least three financial years. In principle,
government securities could also be listed on the bond market but are not presently
traded. Before they can be listed, the Bulgarian national bank (BNB) which manages
2 Under the currency board arrangement, the exchange rate is fixed at I lev -- I DEM.
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the market in government bonds, would need to amend its regulations. Although the
barriers to official market listing are very low, there are still very few market
participants. For individuals, trading directly in the market is relatively expensive. Few
companies have tried to raise additional capitalby issuing new bonds or shares.
fh. gSp-Sofia is striving to improve its operation by focusing on the trading
system and the clearing and settlement system. Efforts are being made to improve its
information technology systems and even create a system where remote trades can take
place. Nevertheless, declining turnover jeopardises the viability of the stock exchange
u, un institution. While in 1998 the stock exchange reported a profit, in 1999 it
registered losses of BGL 560,000. Losses are expected to be even higher in 2000. These
losses raise questions about the future viability of the exchange.
1.1.3. The Securities and StockExchange Commission
The Securities and Stock Exchange Commission (SSEC) was established to ensure
protection of investors'interests and promote the development of the securities market.
The seven officers of the commission are appointed by the council of ministers on the
recommendation of the finance minister. Officers serve for 5 years. The commission
regulates the issuance of new securities and monitors transactions in securities. It
o*rr.., the establishment and operation of stock exchanges, investment intermediaries
and investment companies. It also proposes and drafts new legislation. For example, the
commission deserves credit for the important role it played in bringing the new Public
Offering of Securities Exchanges and Investment CompaniesAct (POSA) into line with
the EU acquis.
Licensing and supervision are at the core of the commission's activity. Institutions
regulated by the commission are required to submit reports to the commission on a
regular basis and notifu the commission of important changes. The commission can
require the disclosure of information and/or carry out on-site checks. If the commission
finds violations or identifies an investor who needs protection, the commission can
authorise and impose sanctions and administrative penalties directly.
1. L4. Central DepositorY
Under the POSA (is well as previously under the SSEICA), all companies that offer
their shares publicly have dematerialised shares, and their shareholder egistration
books are kept by the Central Depository (CD). The CD is also responsible for the
settlement of transactions, i.e. it also acts as a transfer agent. The CD was established as
a joint-stock company in August 1996. The company's hareholders include the BNB,
the ministry of finance, commercial banks and investment intermediaries. The CD has a
five member board of directors. Two mernbers are representatives of the BNB and the
ministry of finance. Furthermore, the BNB and the finance ministry can veto decisions
of the general meeting of shareholders. All transactions, either on or offthe BSE-Sofia,
must be recorded by the depository. Since only CD members are authorised to carry out
registrations, all transactions must be negotiated via investment intermediaries who are
also members of the depository. When transactions occur on the BSE-Sofia, procedures
are carried out which guarantee that clearing and settlement occurs within three days.
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Where transactions are concluded offthe exchange, investment intermediaries are only
required to present documentation veriffing that the transaction has actually taken
place between two individuals. The parties to a transaction are responsible for clearing
the transaction.
The establishment of the CD in Bulgaria has greatly facilitated trade and
transactions in securities. In other transition economies where shareholder books are
kept by the companies themselves, the accuracy of these records have been questioned,
further eroding confidence in the markets. There have only been a few controversies
regarding shareholder registrations in Bulgaria, and there is confidence that
transactions in securities are timely and accurately filed.
1. 1.5. Investment Intermediaries
Under the POSA, all transactions on the BSE-Sofia must be concluded by licensed
investment intermediaries. Non-bank investment intermediation licenses are issued by
the SSEC. When banks obtain their banking licenses from the BNB, they also receive a
license as investment intermediaries. However, banks are still required to register with
the SSEC as agents carrying out investment intermediation.
To trade on the BSE-Sofia an intermediary must become a member of the exchange,
and establish trading posts manned by stockbrokers certified by the SSEC. The SSEC
also reviews the capital adequacy, liquidity, and managerial competence of investment
intermediaries. The commission issues two types of licenses: partial licenses allowing
intermediaries to render brokering services and fuIl licenses also allowing
intermediaries to deal on their own account and underwrite new issues. By mid-2000,
there were 101 licensed investment intermediaries of which 29 were commercial banks.
For such a small and shrinking market, this is a large number. Seven or eight large
investment intermediaries control between 55 - 65 per cent of the BSE-Sofia turnover
and the twenty most active intermediaries account for about 80 per cent. Given this
situation, investment intermediaries have opted for reducing operating costs and have
turned to trading off-the-exchange instruments like compensatory notes.3 Both these
activities are transient. The first signs of downsizing are already at hand. In 1998 the
more active investment intermediaries employed three or four stockbrokers. By 2000
most companies had only one broker and in many cases companies shared the same
broker to reduce staffcosts.
Table 2 shows how the situation has changed. While the number of intermediaries
has been increasing slowly, many intermediaries are not members of the BSE-Sofia and
do not have trading posts. These firms do not attach great importance to on-the-
exchange business and are mostly involved in outside activities like trading in
compensatory notes.
3 Compensatory notes are notes created as part of the restitution process. These notes have
been given to previous owners of property that could not be physically returned. The notes can
only be used to bid in privatisation auctions, but they can be transferred.
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Tab\e2_ NUMBER OF INVESTMENT INTERMEDIARIES
(INCLT JDING COMMERCIAL BANKS)
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Licensed by SSC
Deregistered by SSC
Members of BSE-Sofia
Source: Public Register of SSC
L 1.6. Investment Companies
An importarfi part of the mass privatisation progftlrnme was the participation of
privatisation funds. These funds collected vouchers from citizens and then used these
vouchers to bid for firms in the privatisation auctions. After the first round of the mass
privatisation prografirme conclude4 these funds became investment companies. Later,
however, these companies were required to declare themselves holding companies or
continue their status as investment companies. Holding companies can make loans to
companies in which they hold 25 per cent or more of the shares.a Investnent companies
are intended to have more diversified portfolios and,are not permitted to hold more than
10 per cent of the shares in any one company. All but four of the original privatisation
funds became holding companies.s Unforhrnately no special legislation was passed to
regulate these holding companies o, even though they are really financial institutions,
they are operating under the general commercial code.
Currently, there are only five registered investment companies. Four are closed-end
companies and only one, Zlaten Lev, is an open-end fund. It is also the largest
investment company accounting for about 90 per cent of the assets and net profit of all
investment companies over the 1998 - 1999 period. Total assets of these funds was
BGL 26.8 million in 1998, but has fallen to BGL I 1.8 million as prices of shares on the
stock market have declined.
1.2. General Conditions of the Capital Market
In spite of establishing extensive market institutions and regulatory agencies, trading
has been so light that it threatens the viability of the market and raises important issues
regarding the mass privatisation programme upon which the capital markets were built.
Stocks, as measured by the Warburg 30 Index of the largest market capitalisation
stocks, performed most successfully in the initial period. The index was set to 100 in
a In the present environment where the banks are providing little credit and interest rates on
loans are high, these loans can benefit both the holding companies and the companies in their
portfolios. The loans provide liquidity to the companies, and the holding companies which often
have representatives on the board that can evaluate the risk.
s One company, Zlatinl,ev, split into two parts. One part is a holding company and the other
continues to be an investment company.
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December 1997. The index reached its high in May 1998 at 165 but fell to 67 inlate-
2000. Other market indicators have followed a similar trend. For instance, total market
capitalisation (see Table 3) peaked in the 2nd quarter of 1998 at BGL 3 billion but has
fallen to BGL 1 billion.
Market activity has also fallen over the 1999 - 2000 period. The number of listed
companies has declined and activity has diminished. While figures are not available for
the most recent period, new changes in the law permit firms that were privatised during
the mass privatisation prograrnme to become private (i.e. not publicly traded.) This
should reduce the number of traded firms by, perhaps, several hundred.
Largeblock trades are an important percentage of overall turnover. During the early
months of 1998 there were a large number of block trades. This is because leading up to
the voucher auctions, agreements were reached between privatisation funds and
between foreign investors and privatisation funds to purchase shares in the auctions.
Transfers of these shares were executed through block trades in early 1998 (Miller and
Petranov,2000).
What is interesting is that after a lull, block trades arc again an important part of
overall turnover in the market. Block trades, although they are recorded as taking place
on the exchange, are not normal trades. These are agreements negotiated off the
exchange and reflect attempts by large shareholders to gain more concentrated
ownership positions. A better gauge of the liquidity of the BSE-Sofia auction market is
the number of non-block market transactions and the turnover. As Table 3 shows,
liquidity has fallen dramatically, based on both of these measures. Transactions in the
first two quarters of 2000 were occurring at about half the rate they were in 1998.
Turnover has fallen from a high of BGL 52 million in the 2nd quarter of 1998 to only
BGL 6 million in the 2nd quarter of 2000. In spite of the high cost of borrowing from
banks, the capital market has provided only a limited alternative. Investment banking
has not really developed. There were only two offerings of corporate bonds and no
primary issues of stocks. It is difficult to discern whether the lack of investment
banking is due to lack of interest in new issues or inadequately trained investment
bankers.6 Why have the capital markets developed so slowly?7 There are several factors.
Some are external factors like the 1998 crisis in Russia and the subsequent withdrawal
of international investors from risky emerging markets. Other problems are internal,
however. The core of the problems lies with the very genesis of the Bulgarian capital
market which defacto evolved from mass privatisation. Over one thousand companies
initially traded on BSE-Sofia were part of the mass privatisation programme. Unlike
companies in the West that come to the capital market to acquire new financing, these
companies were registered as public companies in a purely administrative way without
having any economic motivation to become publicly traded companies.8
6 For a discussion of the issues surrounding the development of securities markets see Vitas(lee8).
7 For a comparison between the capital market performance in other transition economies,
see Johnson and Shleifer (1999), Poh| et.al., (1995), World Bank (1999) and OECD (1998).
8 For further details on the impact of the genesis of the capital market on its future
development, see Petranov and Miller (1999).
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Another important reason for the slow development of the capital market is that the
government has failed to take important steps to help the markets expand. While the
new laws like POSA should improve market conditions, it is important that efforts be
made to ensure that the law is effectively enforced. This is particularly important if
good corporate governance is going to be supported and shareholders'rights protected.
The government could provide further support for the market if new laws were passed
that provided equal tax treatment of all institutional investors. It should also be possible
to adjust the law so that govemment securities can be traded on the BSE-Sofia.e
Another problem that must be faced is off-the-exchange transactions. Under present
law all transactions in shares of companies that participated in the mass privatisation
programme have to take place on the stock exchange. This restriction was an attempt o
seek better price integrity and market transparency. Even block trades that are
negotiated offthe exchange must be registered on the exchange. The only transactions
that are allowed to take place off the exchange are swaps and dealings between
individuals. In spite of these restrictions between January 1998 and June 1999, the
number of shares traded OTE exceeded BSE-Sofia trading by 33.9 per cent. Several
other transition economies have been successful in creating viable capital markets.
Bulgaria has passed good legislation and established appropriate institutions to promote
its capital market. Some big issues remain, however. It is important that the government
take a more active role in promoting the market by ensuring that the new laws are
enforced and shareholder rights are protected. It can also help broaden the market by
completing the sale of important companies like the telecommunications company.
2. Insurance
Before 1997 therewas weakregulation ofthe insurance industry and few requirementsto
promote transparency. There were questions about whether insurance companies'capital
came from legitimate sources and a number of powerful insurers .were mafia-like
businesses which often resorted to strongarm tactics. ln 1997 and 1998, the insurance
sector in Bulgaria was thoroughly restructured when the Insurance Act was substantially
amended. Stricter requirements on insurers were imposed and the National Insurance
Council (reporting to the Council of Ministers) and the Insurance Supervision
Directorate (under the Ministry of Finance) were created to regulate the industry.
The highest regulatory body is the National Insurance Council. The Council has
seven members with representatives from the Minister of Finance, the Minister of
Justice, and the Minister of the Interior, and the CEO of the Insurance Supervision
Directorate. The council is chaired by the Finance Minister. It is responsible for
licensing, authorisation of mergers and divestitures, ild bringing insolvency/
bankruptcy proceedings. The Insurance Supervision Directorate is responsible for daily
regulatory matters. The CEO is appointed by the Prime Minister on the recommendation
9 For further information on the possible economic policy measures of the government that
may promote capital market development, see Petranov and Miller (1999).
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of the National Insurance Council. The Insurance Supervision Directorate monitors the
overall activity of insurance companies and insurance brokers. It issues permits to
insurers to undertake certain actions. These include sale of insurance portfolios when an
insurer is undergoing liquidation; conffol overproducts offered and insurance premiums
charged. The directorate also authorises the promotion of new insurance products,
determines the minimum premium amount on compulsory insurance and approves the
annual reinsurance programmes of insurers. It may also undertake certain administrative
measures to stabilise the financial condition of insurance companies.
Since the beginning of 1998 the National Insurance Council has instituted new
licensing procedures for insurance companies and mutual insurance societies to bring
insurers into compliance with the 1997 amendments to the Insurance Act. The majority
of companies in the sector have failed to meet the new stricter requirements. Eighty-
seven insurance and reinsurance companies and mutual insurance societies (out of a
total of 112 companies registered to date) have lost their licenses. Seventeen new joint-
stock property insurance companies and another six life insurance companies and four
mutual insurance societies were licensed in 1998. Table 4 shows how the structure of
the sector has changed over the 1997-1,999 period. The sector is highly concentrated. In
1999 the State Insurance Institute - General Insurance, the largest property insurance
company, accounted for nearly 30 per cent of the market. The market share of the four
largest companies amounted to 70.2 per cent. The concentration of life insurance
companies was even higher. In 1999, the State Insurance Institute - SII accounted for
62.4 per cent of the market white the market share of the four largest insurance
companies was 91.7 per cent. Both the Herfindahl index and the four firm
concentration ratio provide evidence that the sector is becoming more competitive, but
the level of concentration remains high.
Table 4 - STRUCTURE OF THE INSURANCE SECTOR
General Insurance Life Insurance
1997 1998 t999
Number of insurance companies* n.a. 17 l8
State-owned 3 4 3
Private n.a' 13 I 5
O/w foreign companies** 0 3 6
O/w mutual insurance societies n.a' 0 0
Herfindahl index*'t* 0.458 0'421 0.384
Four-Firm Concentration ratio (70)*** 84.1 76.4 70.2
1997 1998 1999
n.a. l0 12
2 2 1
n.a .  8  l l
0 0 3
n.a. 4 5
0.774 0.756 0.658
97.2 94.1 91.8
*ln 1997,the number of insurers (oint stock companies and mutual insurance societies) totalled ll2.Data,
however, were not reliable enough to treat them in separate groups-
**Insurance companies with foreign shareholders owning over 50%o f their capital.
t6tr*1997 estimates draw upon the market shares of the insurers licensed to operate in compliance with the
amendments to the lnsurance Act.
Source: Annual Report of the Insurance Supervision Directorate; Authors'Calculations
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Table 5 -TOTAL INCOME FROM PREMIUMS FOR THE INSURANCE SECTOR IN
BULGARTA (MTLLTONS OF BGL)
1997 1998 r999
General Insurance
Life Insurance
Shareholding companies
Co-operatives
Total
r47.3
t7.5
17.5
0.0
164.8
204.s
28.3
27.6
0.7
232.8
278.1
3 1 . 6
30.9
0.7
309.7
Source: Annual Report ofthe Insurance Supervision Directorate
Currently, the largest companies in both segments of the insurance market are state-
owned. There are two other state-owned insurance companies, and another company,
the Municipal Insurance Company is indirectly controlled by the Sofia municipality.
The remaining companies are private, although there is an indirect state interest in some
companies like Bulstrad PLC which was privatised. The gradual increase in the number
of new private companies, the privatisation of state-owned companies, and the entry
into the Bulgarian market of well-established foreign insurance companies are positive
signs that the insurance industry will continue to grow. During the period 1997-1999,
general insurance generated 90 per cent of premium income (Table 5). Total income
from premiums in both segments, i.e. general insurance and life insurance, reported a
robust growth of nearly 88 per cent over two years.
Despite its impressive growth the sector remains relatively small. Total income from
insurance premiums was only | .27 per cent and L 1 8 per cent of GDP in 1997 and 1 998
respectively. This is far below the 2.9 per cent in the Czech Republic of 2.9 per cent
(1995). Greece at 1.6 per cent has the smallest insurance sector in the EU (See Table 6
for further comparisons).
Under the Insurance Act, all insurance companies must comply with a number of
restrictions on their investment policy. Insurers are allowed to invest insurance reserves
only in certain instruments like government securities, real estate, and municipal bonds.
Furthermore, the strucfure of the various investment categories within total insurance
reserves is also subject to regulation. Holdings of bank deposits and government
securities should be at least 50 per cent, and there are limitations on holdings. For
instance, the relative share ofreal estate cannot exceed 10 per cent ofthe total; the share
of municipal bonds cannot exceed 5 per cent, and the share of corporate securities
cannot exceed 30 per cent. Because the sector has been expanding, total assets and total
insurance reserves have grown quickly, increasing by 51.8 and23.0 per cent over only
two years. The insurance business as whole is profitable, although some smaller
companies have experienced losses in certain years (See Table 8).
Presently, insurance companies are pursuing very conservative investment
strategies. Very few financial instruments meet their investment needs. The poor
liquidity of most shares on the stock exchange has discouraged insurers from actively
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TAbIE 6 _ INSURANCE INDUSTRY INDICATORS _ PENETRATION AND DENSITY
in%o of
GDP
Premiums per capita (USD)
Non-life Life
Premiums (in % of GDP)
Non-life Life
Belgium
Cyprus
Denmark
Finland
France
Greece
Holland
Ireland
Italy
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Russia
Switzerland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
United Kingdome
Sweden
Czech Republic
Germany
Hungary
Austria
EU-I5
USA
6.80
4.29
6.22
7.77
9.25
1.74
9.41
8.37
4.17
4.56
2.74
5.42
r .4 l
tt.94
2.59
J . t 5
5.38
tt .2l
4.71
2.89
6.s3
2.33
5.36
t . 5 J
8.49
909
228
782
442
693
1 0 1
959
622
454
805
69
29s
34
1,297
67
269
385
731
591
t07
973
69
853
679
1,404
711
257
1,221
1,368
l , 5 l l
100
1,233
1,092
376
783
27
262
l 0
2,993
26
72s
341
1,721
62s
39
694
34
517
908
1,167
3.82
2.0r
2.43
1.90
2.9r
0.87
4 . 1 2
3.04
2.28
2.3r
r.97
2.87
t . l 0
3 .6r
1 .87
2.94
2.85
3.34
2.29
2 . 1 2
3 . 8 1
| . 5 6
3.34
3 . r 4
4.64
2.98
2.28
3.79
5.87
6.34
0.87
5.29
s .33
1.89
2.25
0.77
2.s5
0.31
8.33
0.72
0.79
2.53
7.81
2.42
0.77
2.72
0.77
2.02
4. t9
3.8s
Source: Sigma Journal,3199, OECD
participating in the capital market. Furthermore, they do not have the expertise,
information and experience to invest in risky assets. As a result, they tend to invest their
reserves almost exclusively in bank deposits and medium- and long-term government
securities (See Table 8). In 1999, general insurance companies held ovet 52 per cent of
their reserves in bank deposits and invested more than 40 per cent in government
securities. Life insurance companies placed 75 per cent of their reserves in government
securities and l5 per cent in bank deposits. There is very low risk in such a strategy, but
also very low returns on their investments.
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Table 7 - MACROECONOMIC AND INSURANCE SECTOR INDICATORS
37s
1997 1998 r999
GDP (current prices, millions BGL)
Gross Income from Premiums (millions BGL)
Insurance Penetration (%)
Population (thous.)
Insurance Density (BGL)
Labour Force (thous.)
No. of Individuals with Life Insurance Policies (thous.)
Relative Share of Individuals with Life Policies as Labour
Force (%)
t7,055.2
164.8
0.97
8,283.2
19.9
4,749.5
21,577.0 22,776.0
232.8 309.8
1 .08  1 .36
8,230.3 8,190.8
28.2 37.82
4,749.7 4,752.8
1374.t 1,688.9
28.9 35.5
Source: National Statistical Institute; Annual Report of the Insurance Supervision Directorate
Table 8 -NET PROFIT, TOTAL ASSETS AND RESERVES OF THE INSURANCE SECTOR
(MILLION BGL)
General Insurance
199'7 1998 1999
Life Insurance
1997 1998 1999
Net Profit
Total Assets
Total Reserves
Distribution of Reserves (%o)
Government Securities
Real Estate
Municipal Bonds
Corporate Securities
Bank Deposits
Loans Against Life Insurance
0.31 3.09
165.0 261.4
39.6 86.4
3.',1 13.5
- 8.6
0.0 0.0
-  1 .2
96.3 76.7
0.0 0.0
0.28 0.54 0.88
t94.0 178.2 188.3
108.5 86.8 79.0
s3.2 56.9 75.6
0.7 r .7 8.0
0.0 0.0 0.2
0.2 3.s 0.3
45.6 37.8 15.7
0 .3  0 .1  0 .1
5.96
355.9
r03.2
40.7
5 . 1 8
0.09
1.94
52.08
0.0
Source: Insurance Supervision Directorate, Annual Report
3. Pension and Health Insurance Funds
The first private pension funds were established as early as the beginning of 1994. They
started operating without any specific legal framework or regulation, drawing upon the
general provisions of the Commerce Act. In early 1999 there were 30 registered pension
funds, but in practice only a few of them are currently operating. Mid-1999 saw the
adoption of the Additional Voluntary Pension Insurance Act (AVPIA). This new act
provided a legal basis for the social security system in Bulgaria. The system has three
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pillars. The first pillar encompasses the existing system of mandatory pension
insurance as a state provided "pay-as-you-go" system. The second pillar provides
additional pension insurance for certain professions with high risk jobs. Employers are
required to make insurance contributions to special funds. The third pillar embraces the
whole system of additional voluntary insurance. This third pillar includes defined
contribution pension insurance purchased by individuals on the free market from
licensed pension insurance companies.
The new act also provides for state regulation and control of pension insurance -
companies and pension funds and the establishment of a State Agency for Insurance
Supervision under the Council of Ministers. The agency is authorised to license and
regulate companies elling pension insurance. The agency is a legal entity funded by the
govemment with annual appropriations. The Council of Ministers is responsible for
appointing the chairman of the agency and determining the number of staff The new
law also establishes a Council for Additional Voluntary Insurance. The council has
seven members representing various ministries and the Securities and Stock Exchanges
Commission. The council is assisted by a representative of the Association of
Companies for Additional Pension Insurance who performs advisory functions. The
Council is chaired and convened by the Minister of Labour and Social Policy on a
regular basis. It makes decisions regarding licensing and authorises the merger or
divestiture decisions of companies.
Under the new law, the State Agency for Insurance Supervision began licensing
pension insurance companies. Out of thirty original pension insurance companies only
seven were able to meet the new, stricter requirements and were granted licenses to
establish and manage pension funds. It is estimated that the licensed pension insurance
funds in Bulgaria manage BGL 50 million obtained from contributions from about
500,000 people. Under AVPIA, pension funds are required to meet specific
requirements and comply with a number of restrictions in implementing their
investment policy. Investments are limited to certain instruments. Pension funds must
invest at least 50 per cent of their assets in government securities or bank deposits. No
more than l0 per cent of the assets can be invested in real estate and mortgages and no
more than 5 per cent of the assets in other instruments. Investment diversification is
also subject o a number of restrictions temming from the need to minimise investment
risk. Pension insurance companies are allowed to invest up to 10 per cent of their own
assets abroad.
A special feature of the Bulgarian system is that licensed pension insurance
companies can also accept pension premiums in the form of investment bonds obtained
as vouchers in the second wave of the mass privatisation programme. However, most
companies privatised so far in the second wave of the privatisation prograrnme are in
dire financial straits or stand slim chances of recovery so their shares have been very
illiquid. For this reason the investment bonds are considered unattractive for pension
funds. Indeed there are real potential problems here for the pension funds. If many
premiums are paid in investment bonds, the assets of pension funds will then consist of
highly illiquid securities. At the same time, pension funds must make regular pension
payments. This mismatch between the assets and liabilities could destabilise the funds.
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For this reason, no licensed pension insurance company has openly encouraged pension
contributions in investment bonds. I 0
Pension funds should play an important role as the financial system develops.
Because contributions to the "second pillar" pension funds are mandatory they should
grow rapidly. At present, however, they are facing some technical start-up problems.
These problems should be overcome in the near future. Health insurance, as provided
for by the Health Insurance Act, and the pension insurance system have similar
structures. Besides the mandatory health insurance system implemented by the state,
there will also be funds for supplementary health insurance. Companies providing
supplementary health insurance must be licensed by the State Agency for Insurance
Supervision. Currently, there are no licensed health insurance funds as the licensing
procedure needs further clarification.
4. Other Financial Services
Other financial institutions that are commonly found in countries with more developed
financial markets have not made serious inroads in Bulgaria. In part this is due to the
breadth of activities in Bulgaria's universal banks. For example, the development of
mortgage banks, investment banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations,
finance companies, leasing companies and public financial agencies is very limited.
At present only four commercial banks extend housing loans backed by real estate
as collateral. This activity may expan4 however, with the passage of the new Mortgage
Bonds Act which details the rules for underwriting and trade in mortgage bonds. A new
local market for these bonds opened in October 2000. The expectation is that banks will
be able to attract additional resources by underwriting mortgage bonds, thus giving rise
to bond trading. This in turn will foster supply and lead to the expansion of the housing
loan market. Until recently the State Savings Bank (SSB) functioned as a savings bank.
Inl999, its legal status was changed into a commercial bank broadening the scope of its
loan transactions and banking products offered. Currently, there is no pure savings bank
operating in Bulgaria although the SSB has the largest branch network and customer
base and still orients its business towards consumer loans. The ongoing restructuring
will present a number of challenges for the SSB since its lacks expertise in risk
evaluation and still has a reputation of poor customer service. Other financial
institutions include two institutions set up under the PHARE Programme to provide
financial support to the agricultural sectorl I and the Encouragement Bank. Established
in 1999 by the government, he Encouragement Bank enjoys a special status and is
suppose to provide financing for small- and medium-sized businesses. After a little
more than a year of unsuccessful operation, the Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises
l0 In the second wave of the mass privatisation prograrnme using investrnent bonds as
pension payments was suppose to support the mass privatisation prograrrme. The programme so
far has been very small and has had little effect on overall privatisation efforts.
ll There is also the State Fund Agriculture which is currently providing financial support to
agricultural producers under different programs has been recently accredited as the single paying
agency in Bulgaria to manage EU SAPARD funds.
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Act under which the bank was established was amended by parliament. The
amendments have provided for the removal of restrictions on the bank's lending
operations.l2
5. Conclusions
The establishment of the crurency board in 1997 was a real watershed for the financial
markets in Bulgaria. During the early years of transition, Bulgaria created a banking
system that had many institutional features that resembled banking systems in western
market economies, but it did not function as a western banking system. Inadequate
conffols over the money supply and poor regulation were important factors in bringing
about the financial crisis in 1996-7. The currency board changed this. Banks nor'I/ are
more highly capitalised. The problem is no longer too many bad loans, but rather very
tight credit. In this atmosphere there should be room for other financial institutions to
compete.
There are also some lessons from the early bank experience when considering the
present state of non-bank financial institutions. Establishing appropriate institutions is
a good first step, but it is crucial that they function appropriately. Since 1997, real
prigr.r, has been made in creating the appropriate legal and regulatory framework for
itt. .*p*rion of non-bank financial activities. While these steps are important, it is
equally important that these new laws be enforced. Furthermore, regulatory
organisations must find the right balance between enforcement that builds confidence
inihese new financial sectors, and regulation that stifles growth. As yet, the insurance
sector is the only sector that has seen significant expansion, but pension funds should
begin to grow The development of the capital market is less certain, but the expansion
of the insurance and pension sectors should assist the development of the capital
markets by providing a new demand for shares. An important question, however, is
whether this will be enough to create sufficient liquidity in the capital market. If it does
not, serious consideration should be given to closing the local market and organising or
participating in a larger regional effort.13
Rt ttris foint in time, the non-bank financial institutions are too small to provide
significant competition to the banks, which continue to maintain a wide spread between
deposit and lending rates.la If these non-bank institutions are able to gain public
.onfidrn.. and expand" this could create more competition for the banks and provide
more financial resources to the real sector. This could improve the prospects for better
economic growth.
12 All state-owned banks but Commercial Bank Biochim have been privatised. Many
analysts argue that the Encouragement Bank was established by the government to again gain
control of a commercial bank.
13 If Bulgarian companies are traded on foreign or regional markets rather than local markets,
it is still imp"ortant hat company law is enforced so that potential investors have confidence that
their rights will be protected.
r+ "An important unanswered question is whether this spread arises from inherent risks or
limited competition in the financial sector.
Jeffrey B. Miller and Stefan Petranov, Non-Banking Financial Institutions in Bulgaria 379
References:
Caporale, G., K. Ifristov, J.B. Miller, N. Nenovsky and B. Petrov (2001), The Bulgarian
Banking System, in Z. Sevib, ed., Bank Reform in South-East Europe, Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, forthcoming.
Johnson, S. and A. Shleifer (1999), Coase and the Coasians: The Regulation and
Development of Capital Markets in Poland and the Czech Republic, draft, MIT and Harvard
Universities.
Miller, J.B. and S. Petranov (2000), The First Wave of Mass Privatisation in Bulgaria and Its
Immediate Aftermath, E conomics of Transition.
Miller, J.B. (2001), The Bulgarian Currency Board, Comparative Economic Studies,
forthcoming.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1998), Capital Market
Development in Transition Economies: Country Experiences and Policies for the Future, OECD,
Paris.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (1999), Economic Survey of
Bulgaria, 1999, OECD, Paris.
Petranov, S. and J.B. Miller (1999), Bulgaria's Capital Markets in the Context of the EU
Accession: A Status Report., Centre for the Study of Democracy, Sofia.
Pohl, G., G.T. Jedrzejczak and R. E. Anderson (1995/, Creating Capital Markets in Central
and Eastern Europe,World BankTechnical PaperNumber 295, World Bank, Washington D.C.
Vitas, D. (1998), Institutional Investors and Securities Markets: Wich Comes First?,
Development Research Group, The World Bank, Paper Presented at the ABCD LAC Conference.
World Bank (1999), Czech Republic: Capital Market Review, World Bank, Washington D.C.
